Abstract: In this Letter, we examine the application of linear cryptanalysis to the RC5 private-key cipher and show that there are expected to be weak keys for which the attack is applicable to many rounds. It is demonstrated that, for the 12-round nominal RC5 version with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key, there are 2 28 weak keys for which only about 2 17 known plaintexts are required to break the cipher and there are 2 68 keys for which the cipher is theoretically breakable requiring about 2 57 known plaintexts. The analysis highlights the sensitivity of RC5 security to its key scheduling algorithm.
The application of the two powerful attacks of linear and di erential cryptanalysis to RC5 is considered by Kaliski and Yin 2] who show that only 7 rounds of the nominal version of RC5 are required to thwart a linear attack; the full 12 rounds are required to provide security against the di erential attack. In 3], Knudsen and Meier extend the analysis of di erential attacks to RC5 and show that, by searching for the appropriate plaintexts to use, the complexity of the attack can be reduced by a factor of up to 512 for a typical key of the nominal RC5. As well, it is shown that keys exist which make RC5 even weaker against di erential cryptanalysis.
In this Letter, we investigate the existence of weak keys for RC5 with respect to linear cryptanalysis. It is shown that, based on the randomizing assumptions of the key scheduling algorithm, keys exist for which the application of a linear attack is much more likely to be successful.
Description of the Cipher: In our description of the cipher we use the notation of 2].
All words are represented with the most signi cant bit at the left and the i-th least signi cant bit of a word X is represented by X i ? 1] . The algorithm consists of r rounds involving the application of 2r + 2 subkeys. Alternatively, the cipher can be viewed as the mixing of 2 subkeys with the plaintext, followed by 2r half-rounds. Let L 0 and R 0 represent the left and right half of the plaintext input, respectively, each half consisting of w bits. We use the notation L k and R k to represent the left and right half, respectively, of the cipher data after the (k ? 1)-th half-round. Also S k represents the k-th subkey consisting of w bits associated with the (k ? 1)-th half-round and generated by the key scheduling algorithm of 1]. Letting L 2r+1 and R 2r+1 represent the left and right half of the ciphertext, respectively, the RC5 encryption algorithm is given by:
where \+" represents addition modulo- Keys That Trivialize Rounds in the Attack: In this section, we investigate the existence of weak keys with respect to linear cryptanalysis. We begin by examining a scenario of extremely weak keys. Similarly to the modi ed implementation of the attack described in the previous section, weak keys can be identi ed when the inputs to L rot 
The probability that a key in the WK m class is selected is given by
Hence, there is a tradeo between the probability that a key selected is weak and the amount of weakness of the key. The two extreme cases are class WK 1 (the class containing all keys) and WK r?1 .
The compromise cases are particularly interesting. For example, considering the nominal RC5 of 12 rounds, the likelihood of selecting a key that trivializes the rst 7 rounds Conclusion: In this Letter, we have shown that, for some keys, RC5 can be signi cantly more vulnerable to linear cryptanalysis than previously implied. Although the analysis presented here does not seem to pose a practical threat to the security of the nominal RC5 implementation -either the number of known plaintexts required is too large or the likelihood of selecting a weak key is too small -it does highlight the importance of the key scheduling algorithm and the non-equivalence of RC5 keys. The next step in the work should be to establish that there are not weaknesses in the pseudo-random properties of the RC5 key scheduling algorithm which might more easily lead to the generation of weak keys than is expected by the randomness assumptions of this Letter.
